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ARGUMENT 
I. Mr. Lundberg and his firm owed statutory duties to the Russells and the other 
Utah home owners that he foreclosed. 
Mr. Lundberg claims that he owed no statutory duty to the thousands of Utah home 
owners, including the Russells, to charge only the actual costs incurred by him in his 
foreclosures. Lundberg brief at 26-28. 
A. The Utah foreclosure statute was designed to protect borrowers/trustors. 
Mr. Lundberg argues that the Utah trust deed foreclosure statute was not designed to 
protect borrowers/trustors such as the Russells. Lundberg brief at 26-28. He is not correct. 
Concepts. Inc. v. First Security Realty Services. Inc.. 743 P.2d 1158,1161(Utah 1987), "[tlhe 
statutes governing foreclosure sales under trust deeds protected the interests of plaintiffs 
[trustors] up to the moment that the property was sold and a trustee's deed issued."; Jones v. 
Johnson, 761 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), "[tlhe detailed procedural requirements for 
a trustee's sale of real property under Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-23 to 34 (1986) are intended to 
protect the debtor/trustor"; and First Security Bank v. Felger,658 F. Supp. 175,183 (D.Utah 
1987), the purpose of the trust deed foreclosure statute is to protect the borrower. 
B. Mr. Lundberg violated the Utah foreclosure statute. 
Mr. Lundberg argues that the only statutory duty owed by him as a trustee to the 
Russells was the duty to give them notice of the sale pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-26. 
Lundberg brief at 28. He concludes that even this section did not apply to the Russells 
because they reinstated their loan by paying the delinquent amounts and his fees and costs 
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and were, therefore, never at risk of losing their home. Id. at 29. 
Mr. Lundberg ignores the numerous protections afforded trustors such as the Russells 
in the Utah statute. One of the most important protections is particularly relevant in the 
present case. Section 57-1-31(1) provides that the trustor may terminate the foreclosure by 
paying the amount that the loan is in arrears, "including costs and expenses actually incurred 
in enforcing the terms of the obligation, or trust deed, and the trustee's and attorney's fees 
actually incurred." [Emphasis added.] 
Mr. Lundberg knew that he was limited to his actual costs. He conducts thousands of 
foreclosures each year in Utah and is considered an expert on the law of foreclosure. He 
wrote the section on Utah foreclosure law in the desk book used by other foreclosing trustees, 
servicing companies and lenders. In this section, he writes that the trustees had to limit their 
costs to the "actual costs" incurred and "the costs allowed by the trust deed." Dennis A. 
Jankowski, The National Mortgage Servicer's Reference Directory, Vernon Enterprises (17th 
Ed.). R. 927. 
Mr. Lundberg violated this section by creating a middle man, a company called 
Rodney Services. This company was entirely owned by him and his family. Prior to the 
creation of Rodney, Mr. Lundberg's staff would perform the ministerial task of faxing or 
mailing the notices of trustee's sale to the newspaper that published them and to the person 
posting them. This simple task was performed as part of the foreclosure services for which 
Mr. Lundberg was paid $550.00 to $650.00. Mr. Lundberg then paid the newspaper its actual 
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cost of publishing the notice and the person posting the notices the cost of posting.1 
After Mr. Lundberg formed Rodney, he caused his company, Rodney, to charge him 
a $30.00 administrative fee for each posting and another $30.00 administrative fee for each 
publication. The only service that Rodney performed for these fees was the same ministerial 
task of faxing the notice of trustee's sale to the newspaper and to the person posting the 
notice. Again, this was the same task that Mr. Lundberg was paid $550.00 to $650.00 as his 
fee for handling the foreclosure. 
After Rodney was formed, Mr. Lundberg negotiated a $30.00 increase in the amount 
that he would pay to the Intermountain Commercial Record for publication of his notices. 
The newspaper agreed that it would pay a "commission" of $30.00 to Mr. Lundberg or 
Rodney in return for the increased price of publication.2 
These kickbacks were substantial given the fact that Mr. Lundberg handled thousands 
of foreclosures each year. See factual para. 33 of Russell's initial brief in which a list of forty-
five $30.00 kickbacks, totaling $1,350.00, is identified as being paid to Rodney by the 
Intermountain Commercial Record for notice publications over a seven day period in October 
lEven before the creation of Rodney, Mr. Lundberg inflated the cost of posting in 
his thousands of foreclosures. This is demonstrated in the Russell case by the $40.00 
charge in the first foreclosure when the person posting was paid $35.00. See fact para. 27 
in the Russells' initial brief. 
2
 Mr. Lundberg admits to this $30.00 commission arrangement. In addition to this 
admission, the $30.00 increase in the price of the publication to cover the $30.00 
commission paid to Lundberg is evident in the amounts charged for publication costs in 
the Russell foreclosures. The cost was $83.07 in the first foreclosure. It was increased to 
$115.00 in the second foreclosure and then to $143.40 in the third, after Rodney was 
formed. 
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2000. (The $30.00 kickback marked "521" was for the publication of the notice in the last 
Russell foreclosure. This number comports with the same number identifying the other 
charges made by Rodney to the Russells and is the reason that Rodney circled the number 
"521" on the exhibit.) 
The real money maker for Mr. Lundberg was to charge more for the title work on his 
foreclosures than it cost him. He received a "commission" for referring all of his title work 
to Backman-Stewart Title Company. The letter agreement regarding "commission income" 
between him and Mr.Canyon Anderson of Backman-Stewart clearly identified a commission 
paid to him that reduced his actual cost of the trustee sale guarantees obtained from 
Backman-Stewart to an amount well below the amount paid by the trustors like the Russells 
to cure the defaults and save their homes. This letter agreement was followed by a 
"Commission Contract" between Lundberg and Backman-Stewart. See fact para. 41-47 of 
the Russells' initial brief. 
The "commissions" paid to Mr.Lundberg are believed to be 30% of the price of each 
trustee sale guarantee. The Russells were charged between $757.00 and $767.00 for the 
guarantees on each of their foreclosures. Mr. Lundberg's commissions would have been 
about $250.00 on each foreclosure. Given the fact that Lundberg conducted thousands of 
foreclosures each year, these commissions added up to hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
The trial court denied the Russell's Rule 56(f) motion to depose Lundberg on this 
subject. However, Mr. Lundberg produced documents that showed that after this case was 
filed, he and Backman-Stewart changed his payment system to a $4,000 per month director 
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fee and $ 15,000 per month "attorney fee." Mr. Lundberg submitted no time sheets or bills for 
his attorney fee and did not keep track of these fees by assignment. If the amount of money 
that he received was kept consistent between the commissions and the $19,000 per month 
received after the arrangement was changed, Lundberg was receiving $228,000 per year from 
Backman Stewart for "commissions" on the trustee sale guarantees which represents 
$228,000 per year over his actual costs for the guarantees. Section 57-1-31(1) prohibited Mr. 
Lundberg from charging the trustors more than his actual costs. Thus, he received about 
$228,000 per year that belonged to the trustors like the Russells, not to him. 
C. Mr. Lundberg did not legally outsource his foreclosure work; he used a 
phoney middleman and kickbacks to inflate the amount that he received 
for his costs to an amount above the actual costs incurred by him. 
Mr. Lundberg argues that he had every right to outsource the foreclosure work that 
he was hired to complete and that is all that he did with Rodney and Backman Stewart. 
Lundberg brief at 30. This simple argument ignores what Mr. Lundberg actually did. He was 
paid the maximum amount of $550.00 to $650.00 allowed by the regulations of FNMA, 
FHLMC, the VA and the FHA to conduct the foreclosures. In the Russells' case, he was paid 
the maximum amount of $550.00 per foreclosure allowed by his contract with the lender, 
Aames, to handle each foreclosure. 
Mr. Lundberg was not satisfied with the $550.00 to $650.00 that he received for each 
foreclosure. He wanted more. He ignored his own advice to the other Utah trustees in the 
Trustee Desk Book identified above, that they had to limit their costs to the "costs actually 
incurred." He ignored the dictates of the Utah foreclosure statute, limiting the costs charged 
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to the trustors to the "actual costs" incurred by him. He ignored the regulations of FNMA, 
FHLMC, the VA, the FHA, and the limitations to actual costs in servicing contracts with the 
lenders, such as Aames in the Russells' case. 
Mr. Lundberg came up with several schemes. He would outsource to his family 
corporation, Rodney Services, the ministerial task of faxing the notice of trusteed sale to the 
newspaper and to the person posting the notice, or he would outsource licking the stamp on 
the envelope that contained the notice. Rodney would then charge an "administrative fee" 
of $30.00 for each posting and another fee of $30.00 for each notice published. He admits 
that the profits from these fees on thousands of foreclosures each year, including one or two 
of the Russells' foreclosures, went into his back pocket. 
Mr. Lundberg claims that he needed to hire a title company to do his title work. This 
is understandable. He had no time to search the titles on the thousands of homes that he 
foreclosed each year. The title company had the right to be paid for its work. However, Mr. 
Lundberg did not have the right to negotiate anti-competitive kickbacks of up to $288,000.00 
per year for the title work which reduced his actual costs for the title work by the amount of 
the kickbacks and not pass these reductions on to the borrowers/trustors. The Utah 
foreclosure statute, government regulations, and the servicing contracts required him to 
charge the trustors such as the Russells no more than his actual costs. 
D. Mr. Lundberg is not absolved from liability because he exposed both the 
lenders/beneficiaries and the borrowers/trustors to the same illegal 
schemes. 
Mr. Lundberg argues that Section 57-1-31(1) required the trustor to pay the beneficiary 
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the amount of fees, costs and expenses that were charged by him regardless of whether the 
fees and costs were actually incurred or whether they were artificially inflated. Lundberg 
brief at 32. He reasons that since the statute places the beneficiary between him and the 
trustor, the trustor does not have the right to object to any overcharges that the beneficiary 
collects from the trustors and pays to him. Id. 
Mr. Lundbergfs argument ignores the fact that he bills the lender for his inflated costs. 
The lender then tells the borrower, such as the Russells, to pay these costs in order to stop 
the foreclosure. In the Russell's case, Mr. Lundberg also sent a letter directly to them in each 
foreclosure outlining the amount that needed to be paid in order to terminate the foreclosure. 
His letter did not advise the Russells that he had inflated the costs above those actually 
incurred by him. The fact that the trustor, such as the Russells, pays Lundberg's fees and 
inflated costs to the beneficiary rather than to Mr. Lundberg is a distinction without meaning. 
What is important is the fact that Lundberg creates the pumped-up fees and they are paid by 
the lender if the borrower does not save the home from foreclosure or they are paid by the 
borrower if the home is saved, as in the Russells' case. 
Mr. Lundberg next argues that if the Russells and the other Utah homeowners did not 
pay the improperly inflated costs that he charged the beneficiary, that the Russells and the 
other trustors would have gained a benefit by virtue of a "discount" from the costs actually 
incurred by the beneficiary. Lundberg brief at 32. Mr. Lundberg reasons that the beneficiary 
will be stuck with his illegally pumped up costs if the trustors are excused from paying them. 
He somehow believes that the trustors will enjoy a discount if they only pay the amounts that 
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can be legally charged. Mr. Lundberg is simply blind to the fact that he artificially inflated 
his costs and that he was taking advantage of both the lenders and the borrowers. The 
lenders/beneficiaries would be out the inflated costs if the homes were not saved from 
foreclosure and the borrowers/trustors would have to pay the illegal costs if they saved their 
homes by reimbursing the lenders the inflated costs, which is what happened to the Russells. 
E. The new Utah anti-middleman and anti-kickback foreclosure statute. 
The Utah Legislature had trustees such as Mr. Lundberg in its sights when it amended 
the Utah trust deed foreclosure statute in 2002 to prohibit the use of middlemen and the 
charging of kickbacks in trust deed foreclosures. Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-21.5. The statute 
is a road map of Mr. Lundberg's practices and makes them a crime. Id. 
The necessary statutory protections were in place prior to 2002 in Section 57-1-31(1) 
to protect beneficiaries and trustors from Lundberg's pumped-up trustee costs, albeit in a 
more general fashion. This section clearly prohibited the trustee from charging more than 
his actual costs. The homeowners who were exposed to Lundberg's inflated costs prior to 
the 2002 amendment should have the protection of the statute as it stood at that time. 
II. Mr. Lundberg's imaginary conflict between an attorney's ethical obligation to 
represent a client with an eye single to the interests of the client and his duties 
under the Utah foreclosure statute. 
Mr. Lundberg argues that he was precluded from owing a duty to the Russells because 
he, as an attorney, was required to act with an ethical eye looking solely to the interests of 
the lender who hired him to foreclose its trust deed. Lundberg brief at 33. 
The primary flaw in Mr. Lundberg's argument is that he was not hired as an attorney 
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by the lenders. He was hired as a trustee to conduct the foreclosures pursuant to the Utah 
statute. His rights, powers and duties were clearly defined in the statute. He was required 
to abide by them. They included protections for both the beneficiaries and the trustors, 
including the critical protection of limiting him, as the trustee, to his actual costs and fees 
incurred in the foreclosures. 
Other non-attorney persons and entities can act as trustees. Utah Code Ann. §57-1-21. 
They, as non-attorneys, would have no ethical problem carrying out the duties required of 
them by the statute. Mr. Lundberg's argument actually indicates that he, as an attorney, is 
disabled from acting as a trustee under the statute because his ethical obligations prohibit him 
from acting consistent with the statute. Such a result could not have been intended because 
the Legislature expressly authorized attorneys to be trustees.3 
Another major flaw in Mr. Lundberg's argument is the fact that he never acted in the 
best interest of the lenders/beneficiaries as he claims to have been ethically bound to do. His 
practice of inflating his costs through a phoney middleman and kickbacks took money from 
both the lenders and the borrowers. The lenders paid the pumped-up costs if they ended up 
with the homes through completed foreclosures with credit bids of the amount of their loans 
plus Mr. Lundberg's inflated fees and costs. The borrowers paid the inflated costs if they 
saved their homes from foreclosure through reinstating the loans by paying the delinquent 
amount of the loans plus Mr. Lundberg's inflated costs. 
3
 The legislature chose attorneys to be trustees because of their "credentials of 
trustworthiness." Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978). 
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III. Mr. Lundberg owed common law duties to the Russells. 
Mr. Lundberg argues that he would only owe a common law duty to the Russells if 
such a duty arose at the time their trust deed was signed. Lundberg brief at 20. He reasons 
that since he had not met or talked with them at the time the trust deed was signed, he owed 
them no common law duty. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court clearly recognized the opportunity for foreclosing trustees 
to take advantage of the borrowers whose trust deeds they were foreclosing. In Blodgett v. 
Martsch, 590 P.2d 302, the Court reasoned that the trustee owed the trustor a fiduciary duty 
during the foreclosure because of the lack of court oversight in the non-judicial foreclosure 
process and the consequent prospect and ease of unfair dealing and overreaching by the 
trustee. The Court then held that "the duty of the trustee under the trust deed was greater 
than the mere obligation to sell the pledged property in accordance with the default provision 
of the trust deed instrument, it is a duty to treat the trustor fairly and in accordance with a 
high punctilio of honor." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court refined its position taken in Blodgett in First Security Bank 
of Utah v. Banberrv Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989). The Court held that in cases: 1) 
where the trustor reposes trust or confidence in the trustee and relies on the trustee's 
guidance; 2) where the trustee could exercise extraordinary influence over the trustor; or 3) 
where the trustee stands in a dominant position to the trustor, the trustee would have a 
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fiduciary duty to act on behalf of the trustor. Id. at 1256.4 
Mr. Lundberg admits that he received commissions or kickbacks from the 
Intermountain Commercial Record and from Backman-Stewart Title that resulted in his 
actual costs being lower than the amounts that he charged the Russells and the other trustors. 
He admits that he formed Rodney for no other reason than to perform the same ministerial 
act (for which he was already paid $550 to $650 in trustee's fees) of faxing the foreclosure 
notice to the newspaper and to the persons posting the notice and then charge the trustors two 
$30.00 administrative fees on each foreclosure for that service. Mr. Lundberg admits that 
he sent letters to the Russells setting forth the inflated amounts of his costs as the costs that 
they would need to pay in order to stop his foreclosures. Lundberg brief at 25. 
The Russells and the other trustors were faced with losing their homes. They relied 
on Lundberg' s demands for specific amounts without knowing that he had artificially inflated 
their price. They paid the amounts charged by Lundberg without question. The trustors 
clearly met the requirements of Banberry Crossing for creation of a fiduciary relationship. 
They reposed their trust and confidence in Lundberg and relied on him to tell him the truth 
about his costs and the amount of monies legally required to stop his foreclosures. Lundberg 
exercised extraordinary influence over the trustors. He was trying to take their homes from 
them. He took advantage of his position and charged them for costs that he was precluded 
from collecting. Finally, Lundberg stood in a dominant position to the trustors. He 
4
 This Court followed the Utah Supreme Court's analysis of the duties owed by a 
foreclosing trustee in Five F v. Heritage Savings Bank, 81 P.3d 105, 108 (Ut. App. 2003). 
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controlled their right to a home, shelter for their families. He used that dominant position to 
collect monies to which he had no legal right. Lundberg stood in the position of a fiduciary 
and he clearly violated the duties that he owed. 
IV, Mr. Lundberg owed the Russells the duty to not defraud them. 
In First Security Bank of Utah v. Banberrv Crossing, 780 P.2d at 1256, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the trustor had to be honest with the trustors. This Court echoed 
that duty in Five F. v. Heritage Savings Bank, 81 P.3d at 108. 
Mr. Lundberg argues that he dealt fairly with the Russells. He states to this Court that 
"the only representations made by employees of the Lundberg Firm to the Russells accurately 
set forth the amounts that the Russells needed to pay to the beneficiary to cure the defaults 
and reinstate their loan. In particular, the amounts that the Russells were required to pay to 
the beneficiary for the TSGs and the posting and publication costs accurately reflected the 
actual amounts that the beneficiary, as well as the Lundberg Firm, paid for those items." 
Lundberg brief at 39. 
Mr. Lundberg ignores the fact that he used a phoney middleman that he owned, 
Rodney, to inflate the costs of publishing and posting by charging administrative expenses 
for work for which he was already paid in his trustee's fee of $550 to $650. He ignores the 
fact that he received commissions and kickbacks from the Intermountain Commercial Record 
and Backman-Stewart Title that greatly reduced his actual costs for publishing the 
foreclosure notices and for the trustee sales guarantees. 
Mr. Lundberg points out that a person is liable for fraud if he makes false 
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representations himself, authorizes someone to make them for him, or participated in the 
misrepresentations in some way. Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon. 746 P.2d 785, 792 (Utah 
App. 1987). Mr. Lundberg was the principal force behind his schemes to artificially inflate 
his costs. He sent letters to the Russells telling them that they had to pay the inflated costs 
to stop the foreclosures without telling them that the costs were actually higher than what he 
actually incurred and could legally charge. He failed to tell them that he had formed a family 
company, Rodney, to hide unnecessary administrative fees, and that he was receiving 
substantial kickbacks and commissions that reduced his cost of publishing and title work. 
Mr. Lundberg was doing what he told the other trustees in Utah in the Trustee's 
Handbook not to do; charging more than actual costs. He was doing what the Utah 
Legislature eventually decided was so egregious that they passed a law that clearly prohibited 
his schemes and made it a crime to engage in them. See Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-21.5. Mr. 
Lundberg dealt dishonestly with the trustors and should be held liable for the costs that he 
charged over the amount of his actual costs. First Security Bank of Utah v. Banberry 
Crossing. 780 P.2d at 1256; and Five F. v. Heritage Savings Bank. 81 P.3d at 108.5 
V. Lundberg was unjustly enriched by the Russells and the other 
borrowers/trustors. 
Mr. Lundberg argues that the Russell's unjust enrichment claim must fail because the 
lenders/beneficiaries conferred the benefit of payment of his fees and costs on him, not the 
5
 As the Russells point out in their original brief, Mr. Lundberg's practices also run 
afoul of the common law claim of negligent misrepresentation. Nothing new needs to be 
added in reply. 
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trustors/borrowers. Lundberg brief at 40. He reasons that since the lenders paid him the 
monies necessary to terminate the foreclosures on the Russells' home and the homes of the 
other trustors that the trustors were not the persons who conferred the benefit of the illegally 
enhanced costs. Id. As pointed out above, Mr. Lundberg ignores the fact that he told the 
Russells and the lenders how much in fees and costs that had to be paid to him in order to 
stop the foreclosures. The Russells had to pay the costs that were well above the actual costs 
incurred, as did the other trustors who saved their homes from foreclosure. The trustors were 
the ultimate payors of the illegally enhanced costs. 
Mr. Lundberg also argues that Backman-Stewart was the party who conferred the 
benefit of the commissions and kickbacks paid to him on the trustee sales guarantees, not the 
trustors like the Russells. Lundberg brief at 40. His reasoning ignores the fact that his actual 
costs for this title work were lower, by the amounts of the commissions, than the amounts 
he charged the trustors. The trustors, such as the Russells, paid more than they had to pay 
under Section 57-1-31(1), the regulations of FNMA, FHLMC, the VA and the FHA and the 
servicing contracts with the lenders. The Russells and the other trustors unjustly enriched Mr. 
Lundberg from their own pockets. 
VI. Mr. Lundberg, his family members who were co-owners of Rodney, the 
Intermountain Commercial Record, and Backman-Stewart Title conspired to 
cheat and defraud the trustors such as the Russells. 
Mr. Lundberg argues that he conspired with no one. Thus, he concludes that the 
Russells' civil conspiracy claim was rightfully dismissed. Lundberg brief at 46. 
Mr. Lundberg admits that he conspired with his family members who were co-owners 
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of Rodney to charge a $30.00 administrative fee for posting and another $30.00 
administrative fee for publishing each foreclosure notice. Rodney did nothing for this fee 
except fax the notice to the newspaper and the person posting the notice. This ministerial 
task was part of the work for which Lundberg was paid $550 to $650 in trustee's fees. 
Mr. Lundberg admits that he conspired with the Intermountain Commercial Record 
to inflate the costs of publication in order to cover a $30.00 kickback on each foreclosure. 
Mr. Lundberg admits that he conspired with Backman-Stewart to charge the trustors 
substantially more for the trustee sale guarantee on each foreclosure than the amount 
ultimately paid to Backman-Stewart after commissions were paid back to him. 
Mr. Lundberg also claims that his schemes were normal business transactions. 
Lundberg brief at 46. He concludes that, as such, they cannot be the basis for a civil 
conspiracy claim. Id. Normal business transactions do not violate the advice he gave other 
trustees as the preeminent expert on foreclosure law, do not violate Utah's foreclosure 
statutes, do not violate the regulations of FNMA, FHLMC, the VA and the FHA, do not 
violate the servicing agreements with the lenders, such as Aames in the Russells' case, and 
do not need special legislation from the Utah Legislature to expressly outlaw his practices 
and make them a crime. 
As set forth in their original brief, the actions of Lundberg, Rodney, the Intermountain 
Commercial Record and Backman-Stewart met the elements of a civil conspiracy cause of 
action. 
VII. The Russells should have the opportunity to present evidence to the jury on the 
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issue of punitive damages. 
Mr. Lundberg argues that the Russells have not presented clear and convincing 
evidence of the elements of punitive damages as set forth in Utah Code Ann.§ 78-18-1. 
Lundberg brief at 48. 
The present case is before this Court on motions for summary judgment and motions 
to dismiss. The Russells have not had an opportunity to fully develope the facts on this issue. 
However, the facts to which Mr. Lundberg has admitted establishes that his acts were willful 
and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward their rights. Utah Code Ann.§ 78-18-1. 
Mr. Lundberg knew that he was limited to collecting only actual costs incurred in his 
foreclosures. He held himself out as an expert in the industry. He prepared a summary of 
Utah foreclosure law in The National Mortgage Servicer's Reference Directory, a desk book 
used by other trustees in their foreclosures. He wrote in the Directory that "[t]he lender may 
recover fees, costs and advances provided they are reasonable, actually incurred and 
permitted by the documents." [Emphasis added.] R.927. Notwithstanding this knowledge, 
Mr. Lundberg formed a dummy corporation owned by his family to hide unnecessary 
administrative fees that doubled the cost of posting and substantially increased the cost of 
publication. The corporation also took kickbacks from the Intermountain Commercial 
Record for publication after increasing the cost of publication to cover the kickbacks. 
Mr. Lundberg and Canyon Anderson of Backman-Stewart created a commission, 
which was simply a kickback, for the large volume of TSG work provided by Lundberg. 
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These commissions hid the actual cost of the TSGs to Mr. Lundberg which was much lower 
than the costs charged to the borrowers/trustors. They changed the form of the kickbacks 
several times in response to the state of Utah's investigation of their splitting of title 
insurance premiums and in response to this lawsuit. The Russells should have the 
opportunity to present proof on the elements of punitive damages. 
VIII. Lundberg breached the terms of the Russells' trust deed. 
Mr. Lundberg disputes that he was a party to the Russells' trust deed and, therefore, 
had no duties under this contract. Lundberg brief at 35. However, Mr. Lundberg contracted 
with the lender to act as the trustee in its trust deeds and he was the original trustee under the 
Russell's contract.6 This Court recognized that a trustee was a party to the trust deed contract 
in Five F. v. Heritage Savings Bank, 81 P.3d at 109. 
Mr. Lundberg was bound by the trustors' protections and his duties in the trust deed. 
These protections included the duty to pay only the actual foreclosure costs if the Russells 
reinstated the trust deed by curing the default, para. 18; the duty, at the trustee's sale, to pay 
the actual costs of the trustee, para. 21; and the duty of the trustor to reimburse the trustee for 
his fees "permitted by applicable law" and his actual costs, para. 35. The trust deed did not 
authorize Lundberg to inflate his costs above the actual costs incurred by him. He, thereby, 
6
 In the cases where he is not the original trustee, Mr. Lundberg agrees to be a 
substituted trustee and a Substitution of Trustee is recorded pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
57-1-22. He is then bound to the obligations of the trustee under the trust deed. Indeed, 
paragraph 23 of the trust deed states that the substituted trustee shall "succeed to all [the 
prior trustee's] title, estate, rights, powers and duties." R.39. 
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breached the terms of the trust deed. 
Mr. Lundberg claims that he received no consideration for being the trustee. 
Lundberg brief at 35. He concludes that his contractual obligations are, therefore, void. Id. 
Mr. Lundberg is in the business of foreclosing thousands of tust deeds each year. To help 
assure that he receives the business of the lenders, he contracted with them to be listed as the 
trustee on their trust deeds. He did so with the Russell's lender. He receieves many 
hundreds of thousands of dollars each year foreclosing thousands of trust deeds. He received 
several thousand dollars foreclosing the Russells' trust deed. He received consideration to 
act as the trustee under the trust deeds. 
IX. Utah Unfair Practices Act. 
A. Elements of the Utah Unfair Practices Act. 
Both the Backman-Stewart and the Lundberg defendants argue that the Russells' 
claim does not meet the requirements of the Utah Unfair Practices Act ("UP A"). Backman-
Stewart brief at 15 & 27. The Court should focus on the wording of the UPA. There are 
four sections of the UPA that make the kickback/commission agreements illegal. 
First, the UPA makes it unlawful for any person (Lundberg) to discriminate in the 
price between different purchasers (Intermountain Commercial Record and other 
newspapers; Backman-Stewart and other title companies) of commodities of like grade and 
quality, where the commodities are consumed or resold within Utah, where the effect of the 
discrimination may tend to create a monopoly or prevent competition with the person who 
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination or with the customers of 
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either of them. Utah Code Ann.§ 13-5-3(l)(a).7 
The kickback agreement between Lundberg and the Commercial Record was a clear 
discrimination in the price of the publishing services offered by the paper. It would "tend 
to create a monopoly" or "prevent competition" by other newspapers who were unwilling to 
give Lundberg the same kickback since it was part of an illegal scheme designed by allow 
Lundberg to collect more costs than the Utah foreclosure statute allowed. The scheme 
impacted the other newspapers in the state who were competing for Lundberg's business as 
the highest volume trustee in the state. It also impacted the "customers" of Lundberg, the 
beneficiaries and the trustors, who had to pay the higher prices for the publication services. 
The anti-competitive effect of the scheme is demonstrated by the fact that the publishing 
costs in the Russells' third foreclosure were about $60.00 more than in the first foreclosure 
when the $30.00 kickback was not being offered. 
The commission/kickback agreement between Lundberg and Backman-Stewart was 
not offered to any other trustee. It was a clear discrimination in the price of the trustee sale 
guarantees offered by the title company. It would "tend to create a monopoly" or "prevent 
competition" by other title companies who were unwilling to give Lundberg the same 
kickback since it was part of an illegal scheme designed to allow Lundberg to collect more 
7
 This section allows the customers of either Lundberg or his suppliers, the 
Commercial Record and Backman-Stewart, to sue for the anti-competitive effects of the 
agreements. The trustor/borrowers who ultimately pay the costs of the publication and 
title work if they save their homes from foreclosure are Lundberg's customers. The Utah 
foreclosure statute makes it clear that Lundberg owes the trustors certain duties, 
especially when it comes to charging more than the actual costs of foreclosure. 
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money for costs than the Utah foreclosure statute allowed. The scheme impacted the other 
title companies in the state who were competing for Lundberg's business as the highest 
volume trustee in the state. It also impacted the "customers" of Lundberg, the beneficiaries 
and the trustors, who had to pay the higher prices for the title work. The anti-competitive 
effect of the scheme is demonstrated by the fact that Lundberg admits that he sent the title 
work on all of his thousands of foreclosures to Backman-Stewart. Lundberg brief at 8. 
The second section of the UPA that the defendants violated, Section 13-5-3(4), was 
specifically designed to prohibit the practices of the defendants. This section makes it 
unlawful for any person to pay, or contract for payment of, anything of value to a customer 
unless the payment is available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers 
competing in the distribution of the products. This section was designed to prevent a 
customer (Lundberg) from moving his business to a seller of a product (the Commercial 
Record and Backman-Stewart) because of special treatment that was so special that it would 
not be offered to other customers of the seller. Lundberg naturally moved all of the work on 
his thousands of foreclosures to the Commercial Record and Backman-Stewart because of 
the special treatment (kickbacks and commissions) that he received. 
The next section of the UPA that the defendants violated is Section 13-5-3(5). This 
section makes it unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against 
another purchaser of a commodity bought for resale by offering or giving of services or 
facilities to the purchaser that are not available to other purchasers on equal terms. The 
Intermountain Commercial Record and Backman-Stewart offered and gave Lundberg money 
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in an illegal scheme designed to circumvent the protections afforded trustors in the Utah 
foreclosure statute that was not available to other trustors. The effect of this scheme was that 
Lundberg moved all of his business to Backman-Stewart and the Commercial Record. 
The final section of the UPA that the defendants violated was Section 13-5-3(6). This 
section made it unlawful for a person to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is 
prohibited by the UPA. The expansive nature of this section, and also of the other UPA 
sections, makes it clear that the Utah Legislature intended to weed out price discriminations 
of any kind. Price discrimination schemes are limited in their shape and form by only the 
imagination of the parties creating them. They seek to limit competition and concentrate the 
purchase and sale of goods and services in an industry into the hands of the perpetrators. 
This is exactly what happened with Lundberg. He controlled the majority of the trustee 
foreclosure work in Utah. He wanted to be paid more for his foreclosures than allowed by 
law. The Commercial Record and Backman-Stewart were willing to strike deals with him 
that would allow him to accomplish his desire in return for all of his business. 
B. The Russells have standing to sue under the UPA. 
Both Backman-Stewart and Lundberg argue that the Russells do not have standing to 
maintain an action under the UPA. Lundberg brief at 41 and Backman-Stewart brief at 17. 
The best place to determine if a person has standing to sue under a statute is the statute 
itself. Section 13-5-14 states that "any person" may sue under the UPA for an injunction 
regardless of whether he or she is damaged. If that person is injured by the defendants' 
actions, he or she can also recover damages. 
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The standing to sue under the UPA is very broad and demonstrates the Utah 
Legislature's level of concern over anti-competitive pricing.8 The Russells met the definition 
of "person" in Section 13-5-2. They, therefore, had the right to sue for injunctive relief. In 
addition, they were injured by the kickback/commission agreements between Lundberg and 
the Commercial Record and Backman Stewart. In order to save their home, they had to pay 
publishing costs in their last foreclosure that had increased by $60 over the price of such 
costs in the first foreclosure. Lundberg and the Commercial Record had instituted the 
kickback agreement by the time of the last foreclosure and the Commercial Record had 
increased the price of publication to cover the cost of the kickback to Lundberg. The same 
added publishing costs had to be paid by the other trustors that the Russells seek to represent 
in this putative class action. 
The Russells also had to pay more than the actual costs incurred by Lundberg for the 
trustee sale guarantees issued by Backman-Stewart. This violated the Utah foreclosure 
statute and it caused the Russells damages under the UPA. Backman-Stewart was able to 
produce the trustee sale guarantees at a cost that was less than the amount that it sold the 
8
 In addition to the broad right of standing to sue under the UPA, the Legislature 
made it very clear that "the purpose of [the UPA was] to safeguard the public against the 
creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage competition, by 
prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest competition is 
destroyed or prevented. This act shall be liberally construed that its beneficial purposes 
may be subserved." [Emphasis added.] Utah Code Ann.§ 13-5-17. The anti-competitive 
actions of the defendants and the right of the trustors, including the Russells, to challenge 
these actions must also be viewed in light of this public purpose. 
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trustee sale guarantees to Lundberg. Backman-Stewart had the ability to pay Lundberg a 
significant commission or kickback on each trustee sale guarantee. Lundberg kept this 
commission or kickback in violation of the Utah foreclosure statute. It should have been 
passed on to the borrower/trustors. Without the illegal kickback, Backman-Stewart could 
have reduced the price of the trustee sale guarantees by the amount of the kickback and still 
made the same profit. More importantly, other title companies would have had an 
opportunity to compete for Lundberg's trustee sale guarantee work. 
Given the large volume of foreclosures that Lundberg conducted each year, the 
competitive market place would have allowed other title companies to bid down the price of 
the trustee sale guarantees. This competition was cut short by the kickback/commission 
agreement between Lundberg and Backman-Stewart and is evidenced by the fact that 
Lundberg had given all of his trustee sale guarantee work to Backman-Stewart. The other 
title companies were locked out of the market unless they were willing to engage in the 
illegal kickback practice with Lundberg. 
Backman-Stewart cites Burt v. Woolsulate, Inc., 146 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1944) for 
the proposition that consumers and non-competitors such as the Russells could not sue under 
theUPA. Backman-Stewart brief at 20. Burt does not stand for this proposition. If it did, 
it would fly in the face of Section 13-5-14 that unquestionably gave any person injured by 
the anti-competitive agreement the right to sue for damages. The Utah Supreme Court in 
Burt simply refused to allow a manufacturer to use the forerunner of the UP A as a shield 
against the breach of contract lawsuit by one of its suppliers who had contracted to purchase 
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product at a price lower than the manufacturer's other suppliers. It does not hold that an 
ultimate buyer of the product, such as the Russells, who must pay the price of the product in 
order to save their home, cannot sue under the UPA if the price of the product is higher 
because of the collusive, anti-competitive agreement between the producer and a middleman, 
such as Lundberg. 
C. The Russells were the ultimate buyers of the publishing services and 
trustee sale guarantees. 
Mr. Lundberg claims that the Russells were not disfavored buyers because he, rather 
than the Russells, purchased the trustee sales guarantees from Backman-Stewart Title and 
the publication service from the newspaper and the lenders reimbursed him for the cost of 
these items. Lundberg brief at 42. In this argument, Mr. Lundberg ignores the fact that the 
trustors, like the Russells, were the ultimate purchasers of the trustee sales guarantees and 
publishing work and had to pay for them in order to save their homes. Lundberg placed 
himself between the trustors and Backman-Stewart and the Commercial Record because he 
was the trustee and he benefitted from the inflated costs because of his fraud. 
D. Exemption from coverage. 
Mr. Lundberg argues that he is exempt from the UPA because the Act allows 
differentials in price where the differences are the result of cost savings in the creation of 
each item of product because of the large quantity of product that is ordered by a particular 
customer. Utah Code Ann.§ 13-5-3(l)(b)(I). Lundberg brief at 44. In order to qualify for 
this exception, the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery of each item must be decreased by 
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the large quantity of product. Id. Where there is no savings in the cost of manufacture, sale 
or delivery because of the quantity produced, a transaction is not exempt from the Act. Id. 
Lundberg has the burden of proving that he qualifies for the exemption. He offers no 
evidence that the cost of producing the trustee sales guarantees and the publishing services 
decrease because of the large number that he orders. Logic also does not support his claim. 
The primary cost of the TSG's is the cost of the title search on the home that is being 
foreclosed. The steps that the title company needs to complete for each title search are the 
same regardless of the number of TSG's that are prepared. Each house and the state of its 
title is unique. The title needs to be searched on each house in the same manner whether one 
TSG or 1,000 TSG's are issued. Likewise, the cost of publishing the foreclosure notices is 
the same regardless of whether one notice is published or a hundred are published. The same 
amount of ink and paper must be used for each notice. Thus, the TSG's and publishing 
services do not qualify for the exemption of Section 13-5-3(l)(b)(I). 
CONCLUSION 
The orders of dismissal should be reversed and the plaintiff allowed to pursue their 
individual claims and claims for the class members. 
DATED this. > "fay of November, 2004. 
HOOLE & KING 
Le^fer A. Perry ^ 
raorney for the Appellants 
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61 CONVEYANCES 57-1-21.5 
"active" and "residing in Utah" to Subsection chapter"; and deleted "prior to the exercise of 
(l)(a)(i); added "and actually doing business" in those powers" after "only if" in Subsection (4). 
Subsections (l)(a)(ii) and dv), added "and actu- The 2004 amendment, effective May 3, 2004, 
ally conducting a t rust business" in Subsection substituted the ending to Subsection (l)(a)(i) 
(lXa)(iii); added Subsections (3) and (4); and beginning "maintains a place" for "(A) resides in 
made stylistic changes Utah; or (B) maintains a bona fide office in the 
The 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002,
 s t a t e » a n d m a d e stylistic changes, 
added Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B) and made related Coordination clause. - Laws 2002, ch. 
changes; rewrote Subsection (l)(a)(iv); added
 2 Q 9 > § g d i r e c t e d ^ s u b s t i t u t i o n o f "Chapter 
Subsections (1Kb and (1 (d ; redesignated for-
 2 Q 9 L a w g rf U f c a h 2QQr for « t h i s a c t » ^ S u b . 
mer Subsection (1Kb) as (lKc) and substituted „pr4-;nn nvH^ 
"May 14, 1963" for "the effective date of this s e c u o n u * a ' -
57-1-21.5. Trustees of trust deeds — Duties — Prohibited 
conduct — Penalties. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), the following duties of the trustee 
may not be delegated: 
(a) the preparation and execution of: 
(i) the notice of default and election to sell; 
(ii) the cancellation of notice of default and election to sell; 
(hi) the notice of sale; and 
(iv) the trustee's deed; 
(b) the notification of foreclosure through publication, posting, and 
certified or registered mail; 
(c) the receiving and responding to requests for reinstatement or payoff 
requirements; and 
(d) the handling of reinstatement or payoff funds. 
(2) Nothing in this section is intended to prevent: 
(a) the trustee from using clerical or office staff: 
(i) that is under the trustee's direct and immediate supervision; 
and 
(ii) to assist in the duties described in Subsection (1); 
(b) the trustee from using the services of others for publication, posting, 
marketing, or advertising the sale; or 
(c) a beneficiary of a trust deed or the servicing agent of the beneficiary 
from directly performing the functions described in: 
(i) Subsection (l)(c); or 
(ii) Subsection (l)(d). 
(3) The amendments in Chapter 209, Laws of Utah 2002, to Subsection (2) 
do not apply to a foreclosure if the notice of default related to the foreclosure 
was filed before May 6, 2002. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(c), a trustee may not solicit or 
receive any fee for referring business to a third party. 
(b) Fees prohibited under Subsection (4)(a) include: 
(i) a commission; 
(ii) a referral based fee, including a fee for the referral of: 
(A) title work; 
(B) posting services; or 
(C) publishing services; or 
(iii) a fee similar to a fee described in Subsection (4)(b)(i) or (ii). 
(c) Subsection (4)(a) does not apply to: 
(i) fees received by a trustee for the trustee acting as co-legal 
counsel, if the trustee is otherwise permitted by law to receive fees as 
co-legal counsel; or 
57-1-22 REAL ESTATE 62 
(ii) a nonpreferred participation in net profits based upon an 
ownership interest or franchise relationship that is not otherwise 
prohibited by law. 
(5) A trustee may not require the following to pay any costs that exceed the 
actual costs incurred by the trustee: 
(a) a trustor reinstating or paying off a loan; or 
(b) a beneficiary acquiring property through foreclosure. 
(6) (a) A person that violates Subsection (4) or (5) is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(b) In addition to a person's liability under Subsection (6)(a), if a person 
violates Subsection (4) or (5), that person is liable to the trustor for an 
amount equal to the greater of: 
(i) the actual damages of the trustor as a result of the violation; or 
(ii) $1,000. 
(c) In an action brought under Subsection (6)(b), the party that does not 
prevail in the action that is brought under Subsection (6)(b) shall pay the 
attorney fees of the prevailing party. 
History: C. 1953, 57-1-21.5, enacted by L. Coordination clause. — Laws 2002, ch. 
2001, ch. 236, § 3; 2002, ch. 209, § 2. 209, § 8 directed the substitution of "Chapter 
Amendment Notes . — The 2002 amend- 209, Laws of Utah 2002" for "this act" in Sub-
ment, effective May 6, 2002, added the excep- section (3). 
tion at the beginning of Subsection (1); deleted Effective Dates . — Laws 2001, ch. 236 
former Subsection (l)(a)(v), which read' "the became effective on April 30, 2001, pursuant to 
deed of reconveyance"; rewrote Subsection (2), Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
adding designations and Subsection (2)(c); and Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
added Subsections (3) through (6). meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
57-1-22, Successor trustees — Appointment by benefi-
ciary — Effect — Substitution of trustee — Re-
cording — Form. 
(1) (a) The beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing 
for record in the office of the county recorder of each county in which the 
t rust property or some part of the t rust property is situated, a substitution 
of trustee. 
(b) The new trustee shall succeed to all the power, duties, authority, and 
title of the trustee named in the deed of trust and of any successor trustee. 
(c) The beneficiary may, by express provision in the substitution of 
trustee, ratify and confirm action taken on the beneficiary's behalf by the 
new trustee prior to the recording of the substitution of trustee. 
(2) The substitution shall: 
(a) identify the trust deed by stating: 
(i) the names of the original parties to the t rust deed; 
(ii) the date of recordation; and 
(iii) (A) the book and page where the trust deed is recorded; or 
(B) the entry number; 
(b) include the legal description of the trust property; 
(c) state the name and address of the new trustee; and 
(d) be executed and acknowledged by all of the beneficiaries under the 
t rust deed or their successors in interest. 
(3) (a) If not previously recorded, at the time of recording a notice of default, 
the successor trustee shall file for record, in the office of the county 
recorder of each county in which the trust property or some part of it is 
situated, the substitution of trustee. 
The Definitive Source of 




Dennis A. lankowski 
L-000142 
W 
THE NATIONAL MORTGAGE SERVICER'S 
REFERENCE DIRECTORY 
(SEVENTEENTH EDITION) 
Dennis A Jankowski 
Distributed by Vernon Enterpnses 
Copynght© 1994, 1995, 1996. 1997, 1998. 1999 2000 
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or used in any 
means, including photocopying, without permission tor Vernon Enterpnses. 
Vernon Enterpnses 
Post Office Box -ki3 
Perry Hall MD _1128 




Fannie Mae will select counsel and initiate eviction proceedings for any property for which 
Fannie Mae retains the responsibility for disposition of the acquired property. Fannie Mae will 
notify the servicer of its attorney selection by faxing it a copy of the referral letter. Fannie 
Mae will generate its eviction instructions based upon the information contained in the 
servicer's REOgram. The servicer will remain responsible for paying the attorney the approved 
fee and requesting reimbursement by submitting a Cash Disbursement Request (Form 571) or 
transmitting its request via the Asset Management Network or Advanris CPU-to-CPU 
transmission. 
The Fannie Mae selected attorney will contact the servicer for any documents or information 
required to initiate the eviction action. 
14. FANNIE MAE ALLOWABLE FEES & COSTS 
The chart included in this section citing the maximum legal fees for completed foreclosures, 
bankruptcy clearance, eviction proceedings, and deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure that are 
reimbursable by Fannie Mae represents the most current information at the time of this 
publication. 
Attorney fees that are higher than the published amount must first be approved by Fannie Mae 
as follows 
a. A Fannie Mae-retained attorney (or Trustee, for Nevada cases) will submit a request for 
additional attorney fees directly to Fannie Mae. The servicer can verify the approval of the 
increased fee through Mornet by selecting "Servicing" from the main menu, then select 
"Loss Mitigation", then UFEB Tracking System''. 
b. A servicier-retained attorney (or trustee), as well as a Fannie Mae-retained trustee for 
California cases, must submit a request for additional fees to the servicer who must then 
obtain approval for the additional fees from its Fannie Mae lead regional office along with 
clear justification for the additional fee. 
In the event a loan is reinstated or the legal proceeding is not completed for another reason 
such as a pre-foreclosure sale, the legal fees charged to the reinstating borrower should be 
reduced to be commensurate with the actual amount of work performed. Fannie Mae will not 
reimburse the servicer for fees and expenses if a loan is reinstated unless the servicer is 
prevented from collecting the fees and expenses directly from the mortgagor due to a 
bankruptcy or other unusual circumstances beyond the servicer's control. 
When the foreclosure is stopped because of a borrower bankruptcy, the attorney (trustee) fee 
charged for the initial foreclosure proceedings must relate only to the amount of work actually 




subsequent action will depend upon if the initial action can be resumed or must be started 
over. If the action must be started over, the attorney (or trustee) will be entitled to the full fee 
for the restarted foreclosure. 
On a completed foreclosure, Fannie Mae will reimburse the servicer for reasonable out-of-
pocket costs associated with routine legal proceedings actually incurred with the exception of 
expenses considered properly allocable to overhead expenses of the attorney (or the foreclosure 
trustee). Nonreimbursable expenses include travel time and expenses, telephone charges (other 
than long distance charges for communication with applicable Fannie Mae regional office), 
document preparation, secretarial or word processing charges, notary service fees, postage, 
photocopying charges, and charges for certified copies of mortgage documents. 
The servicer is expected to advance the sums to defray significant out-of-pocket costs (such as 
municipal liens or past due property taxes that must be paid prior to the recordation of a deed) 
that arise in connection with a foreclosure. The servicer must respond to an attorney's or 
trustee's request for costs within ten business days receipt of their request. 
Any questions should be discussed with the Fannie Mae lead regional office prior to incurring 
the fees or expenses to assure the servicer will be able to recover the amount advanced from 
Fannie Mae by submitting a Request for Cash Disbursement (Form 571) or transmitting the 
571 request using either the Asset Management Network 571 or an Advantis CPU-to-CPU 
transmission. 
The following definitions of services are to be reviewed in conjunction with the chan so the 
reader may have a clear understanding of allowable fees. 
Foreclosure fee is the fee allowed for a completed uncontested action. Included in this fee is 
all required title work. If the mortgagor reinstates prior to the completion of the action, the fee 
must be reduced to reflect the amount of work performed. The attorney may not charge a fee 
in excess of the allowable to the reinstating borrower. 
Deed-in-lieu fees allowed in the event the mortgagor grants the property to Fannie Mae in 
lieu of foreclosure. These fees should be nominal since most of the work can be performed by 
the servicer. If the deed is tendered after the foreclosure action has begun, the final bill must be 
explicit as to the amount of fees earned on the foreclosure action. 
Eviction fee includes all litigation to remove an adverse occupant from the acquired property. 
If the eviction becomes contested, contact Fannie Mae for approval of additional fees. If the 
property is vacated prior to the conclusion of the eviction, the fee should be reduced 
accordingly. Evictions are handled by Fannie Mae selected counsel. However, the servicer will 
sail be responsible for paying the eviction counsel's invoices. 
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DOCUMENTS NEEDED TO COMMENCE FORECLOSURE 
Copies of the mortgage or deed-of-trust, note, title policy, breach letter, and assignment(s). 
Executed substitution of trustee. 
FORECLOSURE SYNOPSIS 
The real property security instrument of choice in Utah is the deed of trust with power of sale. 
True mortgages are rarely used. Deeds of trust can be foreclosed either judicially or non-
judicially, at the discretion of the beneficiary. Judicial foreclosure is used sparingly, in 
situations involving title problems, in some cases where deficiency claims are anticipated, and 
in some cases to remove the borrower's right to reinstate the mortgage obligation and to 
require full payoff of the loan. 
NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE 
The Utah Code (Title 57, Chapter 1, Sections 19 through 36, inclusive, Utah Code Annotated 
{1953}, as amended) and the language of the deed of trust govern nonjudicial foreclosures. In 
the event of a borrower's default, the foreclosure may be commenced at the request of the 
beneficiary. State law does not require an acceleration or breach letter. However, the note or 
deed of trust may require such a letter. 
Non-judicial foreclosure is commenced by recording a Notice of Default and Election to Sell 
with the county recorder. Usually a Substitution of Trustee, replacing the original trustee with 
the attorney handling the foreclosure, is recorded at the same time. The Substitution muse be 
^signed by the current beneficiary under the deed of trust. The Notice of Default is signed by the 
then current trustee. Within 10 days after recording, a copy of the Notice of Default and the 
Substitution, where applicable, reflecting the recording data, must be mailed by certified or 
registered mail to the borrower and others entitled to receive notice. In certain circumstances, 
copies must also be published or served personally on the borrower. 
The recording of the Notice of Default begins a three-month reinstatement period during which 
the borrower or any junior lien holder may reinstate the loan obligation and cancel the 




including all delinquent payments, late charges, foreclosure costs and trustee/attorney fees. 
It is important to note mat the reinstatement period is created by statute and is limited to three 
months. However, some deeds of trust have express provisions extending the period for cure 
until the foreclosure sale or a few days before the sale. 
After the reinstatement period expires, the trustee prepares a Notice of Sale. Its general form is 
prescribed by statute. It must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the subject property is located. The 
last day of publication must be no more than 30 days and no less than 10 days prior to the 
scheduled sale date. The Notice of Sale must also be sent by certified or registered mail to 
those entitled to receive a copy of the recorded Notice of Default, as mentioned previously. 
Finally, the Notice of Sale must be posted conspicuously on the property to be foreclosed and 
in at least three other places in the county. 
The foreclosure sale is conducted as an open auction at the county courthouse by the trustee or 
the trustee's attorney. The beneficiary may credit bid at the sale and typically enters a 
"protective" opening bid. The highest bidder acquires the property. The statute does not 
sanction striking the property off to the next highest bidder in the event the highest bidder 
fails to pay the amount bid. In such an event, the sale must be re-noticed, including 
publication, posting and mailing, as described previously. Consequently, prudent trustees 
require that bidders pay all or a significant amount of the purchase price at the time of the sale 
in certified funds. 
If the successful bid exceeds the total debt, including costs of foreclosure, the excess proceeds 
are distributed first to junior lien holders in order of priority and then to the borrower. The 
trustee has the option to make those distributions directly or deposit the excess proceeds with 
the district court. If the trustee chooses the latter option, those claiming entitlement to the 
excess proceeds must request a court determination of entitlement to funds. If the bid sales 
price is less than the market value of the property, the borrower is not entitled to any non-
realized difference. 
The sale may be postponed one time for up to 72 hours by oral announcement at the time and 
place originally set for the sale. Any further postponement or a postponement for a period of 
time in excess of 72 hours requires re-noticing of the sale, publication, postings and mailings 
as previously described. 
The trustee conveys the foreclosed property to the purchaser by Trustee's Deed. The Trustee s 
Deed is given without warranty as to title, possession or encumbrances. There is no right oi 
redemption for the borrower. The only right of redemption is that held by the IRS, in certain 
cases. Where it exists, it lasts for 120 days and may, upon application and appropriate 
circumstances, be waived by the IRS. 
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A typical uncontested non-judicial foreclosure proceeding takes approximately four and a half 
to five months from the recording the Notice of Default to the issuance of a Trustee's Deed 
following the sale. 
JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE 
Deeds of trust may be foreclosed judicially, at the option of the beneficiary. By exercising that 
option, the beneficiary can prevent the borrower from reinstating the loan in some cases. 
Loans evidenced by deed of trust executed after 1985 can not be reinstated, by statutory right, 
in a judicial foreclosure. 
After securing a preliminary title report on the property in order to determine the necessary 
parries to the foreclosure action, a judicial foreclosure procedure is commenced by filing a 
Complaint and serving the borrower and other parties in interest with a copy of a Summons 
and the Complaint. The time for answering is 20 days for defendants residing in Utah and 30 
days for non-residents. There are, of course, other periods applicable to certain defendants such 
as the United States. The course of the legal proceeding is governed by the same rules 
applicable to other litigation. A judgment and decree of foreclosure is typically obtained by 
default, stipulation or summary judgment. Upon entry of the decree of foreclosure, the court 
will issue an Order of Sale. The Order of Sale is delivered, along with the praecipe or 
attorney's instructions, to the county sheriff. The sheriff then provides the notice required by 
statute and conducts the foreclosure sale. The successful purchaser is given a Sheriffs 
Certificate of Sale, Evidencing the results of the sale. 
Following the foreclosure sale, the borrower and the junior lien holders have a six month right 
of redemption commencing on the day of the sale. Redemption requires payment of the 
amount bid at the sale, plus 6% of that amount, and certain costs, if any, advanced by the 
purchaser during th$ redemption period. Upon redemption, the holder of the Certificate of Sale 
delivers the Certificate to the redeeming party. 
roDowing the expiration of the redemption period, the purchaser or redeeming party delivers 
the Certificate of Sale to the Sheriff and receives, in return, a Sheriffs Deed to the property. A 
typical, uncontested judicial foreclosure, including the redemption period, will take nine to 
twelve months to complete. 
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS 
Deficiency judgments may be obtained in Utah following either a judicial or non-judicial 
foreclosure. 
li a beneficiary wishes to obtain a deficiency judgment, the deficiency must be created by 
bidding less than the amount of th& total debt at the foreclosure sale. Also, a statutory ''one 
action" rule requires that mortgage lenders foreclose their real property collateral before they 
can seek a deficiency. 
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Following a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding, a separate legal action must be commenced in 
order to obtain a deficiency judgment. The action must be commenced by filing a compiaint 
within three months after the sale. Service of the summons and a copy of the complaint must 
be accomplished within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, absent an order of the court 
extending the time for service. 
The amount of deficiency judgment obtainable following a non-judicial foreclosure is limited 
to the difference between the amount due on the note (including attorney fees and costs) and 
die higher of the amount bid or the market value of the property at the time of the sale. The 
court must enter a finding on the value of the property. It is, therefore, imperative that the 
beneficiary seeking a deficiency have competent evidence, normally in the form of an appraisal 
of the foreclosed property's value. Judgment by default is rarely, if ever, granted. 
Entry of a deficiency judgment following a judicial foreclosure is more streamlined. Following 
the completion of the sheriffs foreclosure sale, the sheriff files with the court a return on sale 
setting forth the successful bid price. The court will, then, as a ministerial function in most 
cases, enter a deficiency judgment for the amount, if any, by which the amount of the 
judgment (including costs of sale to the sheriff and others) exceeds the amount bid at sale. 
Unlike a deficiency following a non-judicial foreclosure, the deficiency amount following a 
judicial foreclosure is not limited by the foreclosed property's value. 
EVICTION PROCESS 
Eviction in Utah is governed by the unlawful detainer statutes found in Chapter 78, Title 36, 
Sections 1 through 12.6 of the Utah Code. Strict compliance with the procedures set out in 
the statutes is required by the courts. 
Upon completion of a foreclosure proceeding, the occupants of the property, including original 
borrowers, become tenants-at-wili. The procedure to evict a tenant-at-will is commenced by 
serving a Notice to Vacate. The Notice requires the tenant-at-will to vacate the premises 
within five days. The Notice may be served using several alternative methods. The methods 
include personal service, substitute personal service, mailing and posting. Mailing is not 
recommended because the statute fails to clearly define when service is accomplished if 
mailing is used. 
If the occupants fail to vacate the property within the five day time period following service of 
the Notice to Vacate, a Compiaint is filed, commencing an unlawful detainer action. Upon ex 
pane motion, the Court will normally reduce the amount of time allowed for response to the 
summons and complaint from twenty days to as little as three days. The issuance of a 
summons with a shortened time for response requires a judges signature. 
Subject to provisions concerning bonds and restitution orders described below, the course of 




proceeding culminates with the entry of judgment against the occupant and the issuance of an 
order of restitution. The judgment awards possession of the property to the plaintiff, along 
with treble damages (normally measured as the amount of the reasonable rental value of the 
premises) for unlawful detainer. 
The order of restitution directs the occupant to vacate the premises and advises htm of a time 
limit (normally three days) in which to accomplish that. It also advises the occupant of the 
right to contest the terms of the order or the manner of its enforcement. It must be served 
personally on the occupant, along with a form for the occupant to request a hearing If the 
occupant fails to vacate within the requisite time, the sheriff or constable may enter using the 
least destructive means possible and remove the occupant, along with any personal property 
Personal property is stored for up to 30 days. If the occupant does not reclaim it by paying the 
costs associated with its removal and storage, it may be sold at a public sale. 
If the occupants respond to the unlawful detainer complaint and summons, the plaintiff has the 
option to pursue normal litigation procedures in seeking the entry of a judgment and order of 
restitution. Alternatively, the plaintiff may seek an order for immediate possession by filing a 
possession bond m the amount fixed by the court and serving the bond on the occupants The 
occupants have the option to file a counter bond, demand an immediate hearing (within 3 
days), or face the immediate issuance of an order of restitution. If the occupants fail to either 
demand an immediate hearing or file a counter bond within three days from the service of 
plaintiffs notice of filing a possession bond, the court will, upon ex parte application by the 
plaintiff, issue an order of restitution. 
ALLOWABLE FEES 
The lender may recover fees, costs and advances provided they are reasonable, actually incurred 
and permitted by the documents. 
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